The war in Ukraine is now a year old. On Friday, 24 February I watched two webinars discussing the past year, and what the future might look like. Brookings held an event titled, “Meeting the Russia challenge: Lessons from the foreign policy transition from Bush to Obama.” The panelists, including Condoleezza Rice and Fiona Hill, recalled some of Russia’s past actions, and discussed how they shape Russia’s actions, and our own, today. Also posted on the Brookings page is a special section called “Lessons From Ukraine.” The contributors are among our country’s, and the world’s foremost experts on their subjects.
For more thoughts on the war, see also the Council on Foreign Relations current Ukraine page for more analysis. Finally, RAND has posted a blog titled “One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Experts React” where you can read quick reflections on the year past and the future by the experts.
There was also a webinar online at foreignaffairs.com. Again, expert analysis and opinion. Unfortunately they do not seem to provide recorded events for later viewing. Their year in review can be found here (paid subscription may be required for full content.)
My study of hybrid warfare/new generation warfare continues. Today I decided to back up, thousands of years in fact, and think about the beginning of the study or war, and how it shapes the war in Ukraine, and warfare today in general. I narrowed my focus to three points, all stemming from Sun Tzu’s adage, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
- Study Russian history- from hundreds of years in the past, to Putin’s actions last week, to develop an understanding of his mentality and its shaping of Russian doctrine, his actions and decisions.
- Study Russian doctrine- especially that part of it dedicated to New Generation Warfare (NGW), and pay attention to differences between the doctrine on paper and actions on the ground.
- Take a close look at US military doctrine (which directly affects those of our partners) especially information warfare, assess the shortfalls, and search for indications that they are being remedied.
Putin’s fascination with Russia’s history of imperialism is often noted in articles and talks. It came up in both above events, mentioned by numerous panelists. In summary, Putin may see it as his duty to continue Russia’s imperialist aims. These aims are an integral part of Russian history and life in Russia in general- warfare, hardship, and suffering are part of Russian history and the Russian psyche.
Continuing on with hybrid warfare/NGW, for a concise perspective on NGW and counter-NGW, and where the US Army falls short, a must-read is “Russian New Generation Warfare: Deterring and Winning the Tactical Fight,” by James Derleth, in Military Review, September-October 2020. Pay close attention to the notes at the end- there are important definitions included, not to mention a worthy reading list.
Here is a direct quote from his summary, which urges us out of the past, and into developing robust counter-NGW tactics:
“The dichotomy of war and peace is no longer a useful construct for thinking about national security or tactical operations. We are in a state of competition and conflict that is continuous and dynamic.”
What does continuous conflict in this context mean? In short, it is about continuous and unrelenting information warfare. It is about weaponised information. The availability of information and being connected 24 hours a day is not going away, it is only spreading horizontally to more people, and more remote locations around the globe. And with it the spread of engineered truth- “truth” that fits the writer’s needs, will spread as well. In our post-truth political and informational environment it becomes harder each moment to avoid deception, to sort truth from lies; we have no choice but to continue to try.
Finally, Russian combat losses to date:
Russian combat losses as of 26 February, 2023
At Five AM 