Ukraine Updates and Recommended Reading

Update for today- mostly links to background and current reports, all of which I consider pertinent for developing a solid view of the war in Ukraine, of Russia’s capabilities, tactics, and probable courses of action, and an understanding of Russia’s overall threat against freedom and democracy worldwide.

There is hope in Belarus, where they are still not following Putin’s doctrine to the letter, and may well act to thwart his plans- from 29 January, 2023, from the RFERL website, “Amid Worries Over Russian Forces In Belarus, Former Security Officer Says Belarusian Conscripts Won’t Fight.”

From the RAND website, from March, 2017, see the testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” And What Can Be Done About It  by Christopher S. Chivvis. This testimony, though it is from 2017 and as such its predictions and warnings have become history, is worth the time to read.

The testimony notes Russia’s goals in their hybrid war as creating division in and weakening NATO, subversion of pro-western and democratic governments, the creation of pretexts for war, and to justify the annexation of territory as a few of those goals. It covers briefly the development of Russia’s hybrid, non-military toolbox, growing out of the “traditional” espionage and subversion used by the USSR. It stresses the importance of countering Russia’s threats in the information realm- specifically in the media and news, on social media, and the internet in general, along with strengthening of governments’ cyber security and enhancing collection and sharing of intelligence among European, EU, and allied nations as key in the fight against the Russian threat.

Continuing in that realm, from the Army University Press website, September-October 2020, see “Russian New Generation Warfare Deterring and Winning the Tactical  Fight” by James Derleth, PhD.

For a quick, two-page introduction to Russian Military Doctrine from August, 2020, see “Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy” from the Congressional Research Service website. Key points of note include hybrid and new generation warfare, non-kinetic strategies such as the use of the information sphere (control of media, social media, information creation and delivery, etc.), Russia’s historical and continued emphasis on offensive doctrine and targeting of infrastructure, and lack of concern for mass casualties due to lack of training, morale, and poor command and control.

This RAND page, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND” has pages of resources- background, testimony, and commentary. It covers strategies and positions of all the players, and has sections dedicated to capabilities, humanitarian concerns, diplomatic and political aspects of the war, and more.

More background, from the United Sates Army War College Press, June 2011, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications”  assesses Russia’s performance in Georgia and how it forced doctrinal changes in the Russian military.

Updates directly from Ukraine are available at the Ukrinform website.

For an update on the current situation on the ground in Ukraine, see the latest assessment from the Institute for the Study of War.

Finally, as always an update of Russian combat losses to date, totaling 131,290- an increase of 700 from the previous day. I read that a New York Times report puts the total number of dead and wounded Russian soldiers at about 200,000 so far. The number will only increase, with daily numbers increasing, until Russia comes to its senses, abandons the Tsar’s mania for conquest, and leaves all Ukrainian territory.

Russian combat losses as of 05 February, 2023

Ukraine Updates- Putin’s Demise, Orban’s Big Mouth, Czech Republic Elections, and Russian Dead

According to an interview with Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) on 24 Channel, not only is the dictator Putin’s time limited, but the the ability of Russia to continue to wage its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is waning. There is plenty of evidence for the latter part of the statement, I just hope the first part is as true. Here are some of the main quotes form the interview as posted on the Telegram channel The Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the NSDC):

🔹 «Some events that have been in the aggressor country indicate that the russian dictator is already doomed to defeat»
🔹 «People who are in putin’s closest circle are increasingly aware that russia has no prospects of winning the war against Ukraine»
🔹 «The issue of putin in russia is almost closed. Some people have already known the name of the person who will work there after putin»
🔹 «Representatives of the Ukrainian authorities have their own assumptions about what will happen next in russia and who can become the dictator’s successor»
🔹 «Ukrainians proved on the battlefield that they are capable of defending their independence and freedom»
🔹 «Ukraine’s partner countries will not allow russia to use nuclear weapons. And the nuclear blackmail started in the kremlin won’t have any consequences»

Here is the interview posted on YouTube (in Ukrainian without subtitles.)

Hungary’s Viktor Orban is at it again, acting as a puppet should, following Putin’s lead and stirring up trouble in the EU with disparaging remarks about Ukraine and threats of vetoes when it comes to sanctioning Russian energy. Not surprising at all. If only Orban could be replaced by a better candidate, as it seems the Czech Republic has chosen to do.  In elections there, former general Petr Pavel has beaten the billionaire Andrej Babis in the presidential election.

Comments on Russian “news and information”- remember that all “information” coming from Russia, out of Russia, via Russian sources is suspect,  tendentious, questionable to say the least, and in large part just lies. Manipulation of news and information is part of hybrid warfare and Russia is deep into it, though most of it seems targeted for a Russian audience, as anyone outside of the country with access to other sources will see right through the web of disinformation, propaganda, and in some cases downright humorous attempts at manipulation of facts that Russia passes off internally as news.

From the ISW website, see today’s RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT. From that assessment, comments on front-line Russian milbloggers and information control:

The Russian military command may also be attempting to resurrect its previously unsuccessful censorship efforts targeting the critical milblogger community.ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD conducted several unsuccessful attempts to promote self-censorship among milbloggers from different nationalist factions—including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers—in summer and fall 2022.[26] Russian military command also previously attempted to promote self-censorship among milbloggers by pushing the narrative that Russian milbloggers have been violating Russian operational security by uploading combat footage or revealing Russian positions online.[27] It is unclear if Russian President Vladimir Putin is supporting these restrictions given that he had been appeasing pro-war milbloggers by meeting with them, allowing them to autonomously operate on the frontlines, and tolerating their criticisms.[28] The Kremlin is also continuing to integrate some select milbloggers by offering to let them host TV shows on Russian state broadcasters.[29] The Russian MoD may be conducting its own line of effort to silence the milbloggers independent of Putin. ISW will continue to monitor to see if Putin overrules the Russian MoD’s efforts to silence milbloggers.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict milbloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of a possible new offensive. Alexander Kots—a member of the Russian Human Rights Commission under Russian President Vladimir Putin and a prominent milblogger—stated that there are rumors that Russian authorities will require war correspondents to wear bright blue press vests to identify themselves as journalists in the combat zone.[20] Kots and other milbloggers criticized the rumored decision, claiming that high-visibility vests will only help Ukrainian forces deliberately target war correspondents embedded in Russian units.[21] Some milbloggers even admitted that they have been hiding their “PRESS” labels for years and noted that this allowed hundreds of war correspondents to independently work on the frontlines without anyone’s formal orders.[22] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov also argued that generals who are introducing these regulations should be responsible for each war correspondent’s death after making them an easily visible target on the ground.[23] One milblogger accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately introducing new bureaucratic requirements that will limit the milbloggers’ ability to operate on the frontlines.[24]

Finally, an update on Russian combat losses from the Ukrinform website clearly shows increasing daily numbers of Russian casualties. Since hitting the 100,000 mark about a month back, the number of dead Russian soldiers has increased by 25,000. That is 25,000 Russian “soldiers”… some soldiers, Wagner mercenaries/criminals, and conscripted students, workers, peasants, and aged fathers and grandfathers killed in about one month. But they are replaceable- according to today’s ISW assessment, Putin is issuing pardons for criminals willing to fight in Ukraine, and has also stated that conscription age will not change in the spring conscription cycle (at least not until reporting day gets closer.)

Russian combat losses as of 28 January, 2023

Ukraine Updates 08 January, 2023- Recommended Reading

The war in Ukraine continues, with unflagging bravery and fortitude on the part of the defenders, and the support of the free world.  This is the way it should remain, until the end- that being Russia’s surrender, return of all Ukrainian territory, and withdrawal.  We- the US, Europe, NATO, our allies, should not waver in our support. We should increase our physical support, and increase our “non-kinetic” pressures against the Russian mafia state (sanctions, denial of services, aid to states threatened by Russia). Now, with my personal opinions out of the way, on to some of the sources of data that help shape those opinions.

A recent RAND paper, from 20 December, 2022, Responding to a Limited Russian Attack on NATO During the Ukraine War discusses possible scenarios that a limited attack against NATO or European targets by Russia might entail, what might provoke such an attack, and the range of response and retaliation options that we have. The RAND paper notes the need for the US, NATO, and Europe to have this response matrix ready now in the event that Russia initiates such an attack, and notes that increasing desperation on their part might increase the possibility an attack occurring.

From the Diplomatic Courier from 14 December, 2022- RUSSIA RISKS LOSING ARMENIA AS AN ALLY– Russia further isolates itself from its neighbor and CTSO ally through inaction regarding the Azerbaijan- Armenia conflict. Armenia seeks help from France on resolving the conflict, and close ties to Europe and the US in its choice to promote freedom and democracy in the country.

From Ukrinform, from 07 January, 2023- “Belarus is being occupied by military forces that are stationed at training grounds, most likely for a long time. And there will be no future for Belarus as an independent country,” say Oleksandr Pavliuk, Commander of Kyiv Defense Forces. The story is here- Belarus has no future as independent country- Kyiv Defense Commander

If you have the time or inclination, some light reading- Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and the Annexation of Crimea; The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare by Kent DeBenedictis, is available at Bloomsbury.com.

Another work that will prove informative is Putin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution; Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution, By Robert Horvath. It was published in 2014 and is available at Routledge.com.  I have both books on order, and would like to point out that I am in no way affiliated with or do I receive any remuneration from any of the publishers or sources I cite.

From ISW, update on the war for 07 January, 2023.

Finally, Russian combat losses continue to mount:

Russian combat losses as of 08 January, 2023

Ukraine Updates- Economics, Strategic Goals in the War, and Combat Losses

Yesterday the Brookings Institution hosted a webinar on Ukraine’s economy. The webinar is archived and available to watch by clicking the link. The first part focuses on Ukraine’s economic situation- its fiscal policy, energy, inflation, and trade, as well as current and future needs. A recurring theme in the discussion was the gap between money that has been pledged to Ukraine and money that is actually making it to the country. There was also a thoughtful discussion on reconstruction, with projected numbers, discussion of where the money might come from, and the need to start the process now. The second part focused on historic examples, first with a history of the Marshall plan, then examples of recent reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.

Two recent articles discuss the need for clear, pragmatic, and cautious goals in Ukraine. From the Diplomatic Courier, “Lack of Clear Strategic Goals in Ukraine Risks Escalation” by Ethan Brown, the author suggests that now is the time to consider an “off ramp from conflict escalation.”  He asks “what is the grand strategy?” and references the lack of such in Afghanistan and that unforgivable outcome.  He in no way suggests capitulation, or even negotiation on Putin’s terms, but notes that the Russian dictator is unlikely to back down any time in the foreseeable future, thus suggesting that Ukraine and the world are in this for the long term. 

From Foreign Affairs in the article “Go Slow on Crimea“, the authors Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage suggest caution on the retaking of the peninsula, albeit clearly part of sovereign Ukrainian territory. But they note that not taking it will in fact create unending problems for Ukrainian security, for its relationships with and accession into both the EU and NATO, and again for the rest of eastern Europe, Crimea being a testing ground and staging area for further conquest. 

My take on the situation has never changed- Russia is a terrorist state that perpetuates conflict in order to conquer and rule, and Ukraine is just a stepping stone to the rest of eastern Europe and Putin’s imperial goals. The answer to the problem in short: if you back down from a bully, as soon as you turn your head he will hit you again. Therefor we must:

• Incentivise Russian withdrawal from Ukraine by maintaining and strengthening sanctions and policies against Russia until they squeeze the very blood from the aggressors; this includes freezing (and eventually seizing for reconstruction funding) ALL Russian assets available to countries supporting Ukraine.
• Clearly define that stance that all Ukrainian territory must be returned, including and especially Crimea.
• Continue supplying aid, weapons, and training to Ukrainian forces, and the forces of surrounding countries, and bolstering NATO throughout Europe. 

History teaches us that the Soviet Union, failed experiment in sociological control that it was, finally fell due to economic stagnation and collapse, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the people of Russia and all Warsaw Pact and Soviet Bloc nations getting a taste of western freedoms, democracy, and culture at the end of the 1980’s. History is repeating itself. 

Update on the situation on the ground- key takeaways from the latest post from the ISW:

• Russia may be setting conditions to conduct a new offensive against Ukraine—possibly against Kyiv—in winter 2023. Such an attack is extraordinarily unlikely to succeed.  A Russian attack from Belarus is not imminent at this time.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives in Ukraine have not changed.
• Putin is using two simultaneous military efforts to pursue his objective of conquering Ukraine and securing major concessions.
• Putin is likely setting conditions for a renewed offensive before the spring of 2023 to coerce Ukraine into offering concessions.
• Russian forces may be setting conditions to attack from Belarusian territory, although ISW continues to assess that the Belarusian military will not join the fighting in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas.
• Russian forces continued defensive operations south of the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine.
• The Russian officer corps continues to suffer heavy losses in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans conducted a sabotage attack on a power transformer substation in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.

And finally, Russian combat losses/ citizens sent to their death by their murdering dictator, as of today:

Russian combat losses as of 16 December, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Update, and Russian War Dead- 02 December, 2022

The easiest way to keep up-to-date on events on the ground in Ukraine is to visit the Institute For The Study of War website. You can also find updates on the developing situation in Iran there as well. The following is from their update for 02 December, 2022.

Key takeaways from the day’s update:

• Russia is attempting to capitalize on the Western desire for negotiations to create a dynamic in which Western officials feel obliged to make preemptive concessions to lure Russia to the table.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated as the basis for negotiations precisely the same demands that the Russian Foreign Ministry had made before the February 24 invasion, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitrii Peskov added the further demand that the West recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Russian forces still pose a threat to Ukrainian energy infrastructure despite the success of Ukrainian air defenses.
• Additional Western air defense systems are prompting the Russian pro-war community to question the Russian air campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to negotiate the demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), an agreement upon which Russia would likely renege and that would not eliminate or diminish the ongoing threat to the ZNPP.
• Ukrainian forces made localized breakthroughs southwest and northwest of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued to make minimal advances in the Bakhmut area and conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces may be struggling to properly allocate and deploy forces in rear areas in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Poor logistics, unruly mobilized personnel, and domestic protests continue to prevent the Kremlin from achieving the goals of partial mobilization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to attempt to mask military development projects in occupied territories for no obvious reason.

Russian war dead: from the Telegram Channel Ищи своих (“Look For Your…”) as of 02 December, 2022, the latest figure for Russian war dead has exceeded 90,000. 

Finally, from the Telegram Channel Center for Countering Disinformation from yesterday, Putin appears to be losing support:

#CCD_informs: the administration of the russian president is limiting the number of open sociological surveys on the attitude of russians to the war in Ukraine. State and pro-government russian mass media, sociological centers were instructed not to pedal the military topic and to focus on a «positive» agenda

🔻 The reason is that the attitude of russians towards war has deteriorated, in particular after mobilization and military defeats

🔸 According to the results of a closed sociological survey conducted by putin’s FSS in November, only 25% of respondents support the continuation of the war (in July – 57%, in March – 71%), the share of those who support peace negotiations with Ukraine increased from 32 % to 55%

🔻putin’s authorities are trying to hide the sharp drop in support for the war in Ukraine in russian society. The kremlin fears that a shift in public sentiment could lead to a collapse in putin’s own approval rating and massive anti-war protests

The Strength of Ukraine; War Assessment as of 21 November, 2022

The strength of Ukraine is in its people. Here is one example.

And here is the translation (translation source is LyricsTranslate.com):

O one morning, and yet at dawn

The ground had trembled

And Immediately then our blood had boiled,

Missiles from the sky, the columns of tanks

Old man Dniepro he had then roared!

No one had thought, no one had witnessed

What truly then had been the Ukrainian rage .

Accursed executioners we with out mercy slay

Those who trudge upon our land !

In TerObron are only the very best men,

Only the heroes they fight there in our Armed Forces!

And the javelins, and the bayraktari

For our Ukraine they do strike Russia !

And here our people, and the Ukrainians
Against Russia
Have already united the whole wide world!
And soon there will be no Russia at all,
And there’ll be peace through the whole wide world!

It is no wonder that Russian combat deaths continue to increase, at about 84,600 deaths as of yesterday. When will the people of Russia say enough is enough? The country of Ukraine will never give up.

For a current, detailed  assessment of the war in Ukraine, including maps of the fronts, visit the Institute for the Study of War. Key points for the day from the assessment for 21 November follow:

• Two days of shelling caused widespread damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
• The Russian government is continuing to escalate control over the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian special services are planning false flag attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure in an attempt that would likely fail to pressure the Belarusian military to enter the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely Belarusian forces will enter the war.
• A Ukrainian official acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting a military operation on the Kinburn Spit, Mykolaiv Oblast.
• The November 18 video of a Russian soldier opening fire on a group of Ukrainian servicemen while Russian troops were surrendering has served as a catalyst for further division between the Kremlin and prominent voices in the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine amid worsening weather conditions.
• Russian forces continued ground assaults near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Russian forces continued conducting defensive measures and establishing fortifications in Kherson Oblast south of the Dnipro River as Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian force accumulations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian mobilized personnel continue to protest and desert as their relatives continue to publicly advocate against mobilization issues.
• Russian occupation authorities intensified filtration measures and the incorporation of occupied territory into Russia.