I mentioned the book “Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and the Annexation of Crimea” by Kent DeBenedictis in at least one recent post. I have since added the book to my list of indispensable, essential reading for understanding Russia, its actions over the years, the Soviet Union, and the history and meaning of Russian hybrid warfare. I have only just started digesting the book- it has so much information, leading to so many other sources and required reads (some of which I list below,) that it will take me some time to get through the entire thread.
In summary DeBenedictis explains hybrid warfare, (aka, new-generation warfare, non-linear warfare, or indirect warfare- used interchangeably but certainly with nuanced differences if the terms were deconstructed) as nothing new. Rather it is a rebranding, and adaptation for the 21st century of Soviet counter-revolution theory, used throughout Soviet history to confront its enemies. For analysis of Crimea, the author uses the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 for comparison, offers an assessment of operational and tactical aspects of modern, hybrid warfare compared to “classical” soviet political warfare, that is Soviet counter-revolution theory as opposed to today’s Russian color revolution theory, and applies and contrasts both models.
For a deeper look at new-generation war/ hybrid warfare and the origins of color revolution theory, see the following sources, which include the writings of top Russian military leaders:
At the NATO Defense College publications page there are countless downloadable PDF’s; see specifically “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare” by Keir Giles, from November, 2016. It provides an introduction to Russia’s assault on information space, how they categorise information warfare, how their definitions and acceptability of targets differ from those of NATO and the west, and how the west is currently and has long-been under such an attack. A useful term from the monograph is “perception management,” an age old practice of course, but one that I tend to reiterate and force in every blog I write; it is nothing short the ongoing process of narrative creation, of Orwellian “mobile truth.” Again, beware any “information” coming out of Russia posing as news.
Also see General of the Army Gerasimov’s article from the Russian journal Military-Industrial Kurier, 27 February 2013- The Value of Science Is in the Foresight (translated and published by Robert Coalson of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), reprinted in the U.S. Army’s Military Review, January-February 2016.
For and analysis and interpretation of Gerasimov’s article, see “Getting Gerasimov Right”, by Charles K. Bartles, also from the U.S. Army’s Military Review, January-February 2016.
Finally, there is “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War” by Chekinov and Bogdanov, cited by DeBenedictis and others as another source for Russia’s doctrine of new-generation war.
Update on Russian combat losses- another 1010 invaders killed yesterday, with a total fast approaching 150,000 dead. An Aljazeera report states the fully 30,000 of those deaths were Wagner “mercenaries,” with 90% of those casualties being released convicts.
Russian combat losses as of 18 February, 2023
And to end this post on a lighter note, comedic at this point, but also a disturbing in its clarity and applicability, I turn to the past. On the horizon: economic confusion, political instability, chaos, and no more Pizza Hut.
Ukraine Updates and Recommended Reading
5 February 2023
Update for today- mostly links to background and current reports, all of which I consider pertinent for developing a solid view of the war in Ukraine, of Russia’s capabilities, tactics, and probable courses of action, and an understanding of Russia’s overall threat against freedom and democracy worldwide.
There is hope in Belarus, where they are still not following Putin’s doctrine to the letter, and may well act to thwart his plans- from 29 January, 2023, from the RFERL website, “Amid Worries Over Russian Forces In Belarus, Former Security Officer Says Belarusian Conscripts Won’t Fight.”
From the RAND website, from March, 2017, see the testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” And What Can Be Done About It by Christopher S. Chivvis. This testimony, though it is from 2017 and as such its predictions and warnings have become history, is worth the time to read.
The testimony notes Russia’s goals in their hybrid war as creating division in and weakening NATO, subversion of pro-western and democratic governments, the creation of pretexts for war, and to justify the annexation of territory as a few of those goals. It covers briefly the development of Russia’s hybrid, non-military toolbox, growing out of the “traditional” espionage and subversion used by the USSR. It stresses the importance of countering Russia’s threats in the information realm- specifically in the media and news, on social media, and the internet in general, along with strengthening of governments’ cyber security and enhancing collection and sharing of intelligence among European, EU, and allied nations as key in the fight against the Russian threat.
Continuing in that realm, from the Army University Press website, September-October 2020, see “Russian New Generation Warfare Deterring and Winning the Tactical Fight” by James Derleth, PhD.
For a quick, two-page introduction to Russian Military Doctrine from August, 2020, see “Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy” from the Congressional Research Service website. Key points of note include hybrid and new generation warfare, non-kinetic strategies such as the use of the information sphere (control of media, social media, information creation and delivery, etc.), Russia’s historical and continued emphasis on offensive doctrine and targeting of infrastructure, and lack of concern for mass casualties due to lack of training, morale, and poor command and control.
This RAND page, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND” has pages of resources- background, testimony, and commentary. It covers strategies and positions of all the players, and has sections dedicated to capabilities, humanitarian concerns, diplomatic and political aspects of the war, and more.
More background, from the United Sates Army War College Press, June 2011, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications” assesses Russia’s performance in Georgia and how it forced doctrinal changes in the Russian military.
Updates directly from Ukraine are available at the Ukrinform website.
For an update on the current situation on the ground in Ukraine, see the latest assessment from the Institute for the Study of War.
Finally, as always an update of Russian combat losses to date, totaling 131,290- an increase of 700 from the previous day. I read that a New York Times report puts the total number of dead and wounded Russian soldiers at about 200,000 so far. The number will only increase, with daily numbers increasing, until Russia comes to its senses, abandons the Tsar’s mania for conquest, and leaves all Ukrainian territory.
Russian combat losses as of 05 February, 2023
So much has happened during this last month- I have been disappearing into the desert alone for long periods, necessary for my sanity.
As of today some 35,600 Russian soldiers have been murdered by the Russian madman that claims to be the leader of that country. Way to go Putin, digging your own grave.
This week’s news alone holds so much positive information. The Ukrainians continue to defend, hold out, regain, and defeat the Russian army. The Russians continue to act in desperation, using soviet-era stock to try and win an unwinnable war, and preparing more of their young people to die, even as their financial reserves dwindle and so much of the world stands against them. The US is sending more money and weapons to Ukraine, as are other countries. Support for the defenders of Ukraine grows, as more and more people realise that this is not a war between Russia and Ukraine, but a war between Russia and Europe, if not between Russia and the entire free world.
Turkey has agreed to NATO membership of Finland and Sweden- this is huge. Turkey is certainly a country to watch, a wild card in the mix if you will. But this ups their status tremendously. We will see how Erdogan’s posturing over the last month or so pays off for his image. So far it looks like he played his hand well.
Ukrainian military Bayraktar TB2 drones
I have noticed a lot of references to the Cold War, and our return to the Cold War. I think it should be very clear at this point that what we face will be nothing like the Cold War. We are so far removed from those days, and we will never return there. The current situation is much worse for many more countries and parts of the world. Globalisation has made us all far more dependent on each other than we were even 30 years ago when the Cold War ended. Resources and products can come from the other side of the world, and any disruption is felt like never before. That combined with population increases, climate change, world fiscal instability, the pandemic exacerbating all of it, and most important of all is the fact that nuclear weapons abound with many of them held by less than responsible nations- especially Russia. All of this puts us in a place we have never been, in a completely new paradigm.
A reminder too, that Ukraine and Russia should not be our primary focus. We must not forget about other eastern European countries that are ripe for the picking so to speak. Keep a close eye on Hungary, Serbia (as well as Bosnia and Republika Srbska), Belarus, and the other non-NATO or non-EU countries that Russia or their satellites have had an eye on. These countries, if Putin had his way, would be the next to fall. They are in no way out of danger.
(Re-posted from another of my blogs- this post needed to be here as well, to support other posts about the Balkans.)
As a follow-up to my recent post on the Balkan wars of the 1990’s, I felt it was time to add more book reviews for those who might be interested in immersing themselves in the issues facing the Balkans and eastern Europe. With the future in mind, first on the list is a recent (fall, 2017) edition from the Brookings Institution titled Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern Europe (The Marshall Papers) by Michael E. O’Hanlon.
In summary, the book argues the case against NATO expansion and presents the alternative of a “negotiated agreement” between current NATO countries, the non-NATO and non-aligned states that would remain sovereign and neutral, and Russia. The catalyst for this new type of security agreement is Russia, and namely Russia’s fear of NATO and the west uncomfortably approaching, and eventually encroaching upon, its borders. The author does cause the reader to step outside the western view that our intervention in eastern Europe, most notably Bosnia, Kosovo, and Ukraine, even when labeled humanitarian, can be construed as threatening when viewed through Russian eyes.
The premise is that the new security architecture would act as a deterrent to Russian posturing and aggression and its plans for military growth, including nuclear weapons. It is believed that the coalition of neutral states, not overseen directly by NATO or the United States especially, will eventually allow Russia to cease their destabilisation efforts in the region, specifically in Ukraine and Georgia, and allow these and other states such as Armenia and Azerbaijan to develop towards normalcy after being able to turn away from a continuous defensive/offensive posture.
While theoretically possible, the concept relies on Russia’s acceptance of the new structure. Whether or not Russia accepts, and if so, their willingness and ability to remain faithful to the agreement, is a different story. There would be a built-in “range of responses” to different threats against the agreement participants, be that Russia or other nations. These responses could include anything from economic sanctions to expedited NATO membership for threatened agreement participants.
Street art in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, October, 2017. Note the artists use of a bullet hole for the left eye, obviously the starting point for the image.
Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War by Ed Vulliamy was published in 1994. At that time the siege of Sarajevo had ended, Serbia and its forces understood that the UN and NATO would actually take decisive action against them, and the concentration camps, mass murder, atrocities, and genocide of the war in Bosnia had been exposed to the world. Vulliamy’s book reports what was known at the time of publication and paints an ugly, demented picture of what was perpetrated on so many innocent people by the Yugoslav army/ the Serbian army, by “paramilitaries”, by criminals and thugs. But he also tells stories of hope, heroism, and bravery, of fighting against all odds, and of how so many of the people of Bosnia endured. Interspersing these stories in a book of this nature is absolutely necessary, lest the sickened reader cast the book aside. If you choose one book to help your understand the war in Bosnia, Vulliamy’s book will painfully, yet clearly meet that goal.
At Five AM 