A Year of War and What Lies Ahead, More on Hybrid Warfare, Russian Losses

The war in Ukraine is now a year old. On Friday, 24 February I watched two webinars discussing the past year, and what the future might look like. Brookings held an event titled, “Meeting the Russia challenge: Lessons from the foreign policy transition from Bush to Obama.” The panelists, including Condoleezza Rice and Fiona Hill, recalled some of Russia’s past actions, and discussed how they shape Russia’s actions, and our own, today. Also posted on the Brookings page is a special section called “Lessons From Ukraine.” The contributors are among our country’s, and the world’s foremost experts on their subjects.

For more thoughts on the war, see also the Council on Foreign Relations current Ukraine page for more analysis. Finally, RAND has posted a blog titled “One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Experts React” where you can read quick reflections on the year past and the future by the experts.

There was also a webinar online at foreignaffairs.com.  Again, expert analysis and opinion. Unfortunately they do not seem to provide recorded events for later viewing. Their year in review can be found here (paid subscription may be required for full content.)

My study of hybrid warfare/new generation warfare continues. Today I decided to back up, thousands of years in fact, and think about the beginning of the study or war, and how it shapes the war in Ukraine, and warfare today in general. I narrowed my focus to three points, all stemming from Sun Tzu’s adage, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”

1. Study Russian history- from hundreds of years in the past, to Putin’s actions last week, to develop an understanding of his mentality and its shaping of Russian doctrine, his actions and decisions.
2. Study Russian doctrine- especially that part of it dedicated to New Generation Warfare (NGW), and pay attention to differences between the doctrine on paper and actions on the ground.
3. Take a close look at US military doctrine (which directly affects those of our partners) especially information warfare, assess the shortfalls, and search for indications that they are being remedied.

Putin’s fascination with Russia’s history of imperialism is often noted in articles and talks. It came up in both above events, mentioned by numerous panelists. In summary, Putin may see it as his duty to continue Russia’s imperialist aims. These aims are an integral part of Russian history and life in Russia in general- warfare, hardship, and suffering are part of Russian history and the Russian psyche.

Continuing on with hybrid warfare/NGW, for a concise perspective on NGW and counter-NGW, and where the US Army falls short, a must-read is “Russian New Generation Warfare: Deterring and Winning the Tactical Fight,” by James Derleth, in Military Review, September-October 2020. Pay close attention to the notes at the end- there are important definitions included, not to mention a worthy reading list.

Here is a direct quote from his summary, which urges us out of the past, and into developing robust counter-NGW tactics:

“The dichotomy of war and peace is no longer a useful construct for thinking about national security or tactical operations. We are in a state of competition and conflict that is continuous and dynamic.”

What does continuous conflict in this context mean? In short, it is about continuous and unrelenting information warfare. It is about weaponised information. The availability of information and being connected 24 hours a day is not going away, it is only spreading horizontally to more people, and more remote locations around the globe. And with it the spread of engineered truth- “truth” that fits the writer’s needs, will spread as well. In our post-truth political and informational environment it becomes harder each moment to avoid deception, to sort truth from lies; we have no choice but to continue to try.

Finally, Russian combat losses to date:

Russian combat losses as of 26 February, 2023

Russian Hybrid Warfare, Information Warfare, Combat Losses, and Pizza Hut

I mentioned the book “Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and the Annexation of Crimea” by Kent DeBenedictis in at least one recent post. I have since added the book to my list of indispensable, essential reading for understanding Russia, its actions over the years, the Soviet Union, and the history and meaning of Russian hybrid warfare. I have only just started digesting the book- it has so much information, leading to so many other sources and required reads (some of which I list below,) that it will take me some time to get through the entire thread.

In summary DeBenedictis explains hybrid warfare, (aka, new-generation warfare, non-linear warfare, or indirect warfare- used interchangeably but certainly with nuanced differences if the terms were deconstructed) as nothing new. Rather it is a rebranding, and adaptation for the 21st century of Soviet counter-revolution theory, used throughout Soviet history to confront its enemies. For analysis of Crimea, the author uses the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 for comparison, offers an assessment of operational and tactical aspects of modern, hybrid warfare compared to “classical” soviet political warfare, that is Soviet counter-revolution theory as opposed to today’s Russian color revolution theory, and applies and contrasts both models.

For a deeper look at new-generation war/ hybrid warfare and the origins of color revolution theory, see the following sources, which include the writings of top Russian military leaders:

At the NATO Defense College publications page there are countless downloadable PDF’s; see specifically “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare” by Keir Giles, from November, 2016. It provides an introduction to Russia’s assault on information space, how they categorise information warfare, how their definitions and acceptability of targets differ from those of NATO and the west, and how the west is currently and has long-been under such an attack. A useful term from the monograph is “perception management,” an age old practice of course, but one that I tend to reiterate and force in every blog I write; it is nothing short the ongoing process of narrative creation, of Orwellian “mobile truth.” Again, beware any “information” coming out of Russia posing as news.

Also see General of the Army Gerasimov’s article from the Russian journal Military-Industrial Kurier, 27 February 2013- The Value of Science Is in the Foresight (translated and published by Robert Coalson of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), reprinted in the U.S. Army’s Military Review, January-February 2016.

For and analysis and interpretation of Gerasimov’s article, see “Getting Gerasimov Right”, by Charles K. Bartles, also from the U.S. Army’s Military Review, January-February 2016.

Finally, there is “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War” by Chekinov and Bogdanov, cited by DeBenedictis and others as another source for Russia’s doctrine of new-generation war.

Update on Russian combat losses- another 1010 invaders killed yesterday, with a total fast approaching 150,000 dead. An Aljazeera report states the fully 30,000 of those deaths were Wagner “mercenaries,” with 90% of those casualties being released convicts.

Russian combat losses as of 18 February, 2023

And to end this post on a lighter note, comedic at this point, but also a disturbing in its clarity and applicability, I turn to the past. On the horizon: economic confusion, political instability, chaos, and no more Pizza Hut.

Brookings Event on “Year Two”, the Success of Ukrainian Military Modernisation, and Russian Corruption as a Vital Asset

I will begin be recommending a recent Brookings event: “The Russia-Ukraine War: Year two and strategic consequences.” Please note that the recording of the event is nearly 2 1/2 hours long, but it is well worth watching. There are three separate panels, so you can break it up if you do not have time to watch it all at once. There is a full transcript of the event available as well.

A couple of striking points of note from the panelists, first Fiona Hill, reiterated by Bruce Jones, is the question about the type of war that is underway. They ask, “is this a proxy war?” and answer decidedly that it is not, that it is “more than a proxy war and less than a direct conflict.” Hill made reference here to WWII, asking if we would have labeled our support for Britain fighting against Germany, before we actively entered the war, as fighting a proxy war? No again.

Next point of note is a Hill’s characterisation of Putin, as paraphrased by Constanze Stelzenmuller as a “highly rational actor who makes a point of pretending he is not.”  Keep those two points in mind as you watch events and attempt to decipher all the data of the day on the Ukraine war.

On to commentary: I have seen reports- propagandistic, very manipulated, with selective use of quotes and mixing of messages and sources, to show that the US and the west are suffering from fatigue in their support for Ukraine. This message is false. The idea of “fatigue” is a fiction. We will continue our support, and it will only increase. Russia also continually issues “reports” on the questionable performance of Ukrainian troops. As I have said before, the best way to read such reports is to turn it around 180 degrees- substitute “Russian troops” and read on about the incompetence, unprofessionalism, and poor performance of Russia’s military. To put the level of performance and professionalism of the Ukrainian military in perspective, look at the 2014 invasion of Crimea. This was a low point for the Ukrainian military. Witness their performance today- in about 8 years they have become a disciplined, highly trained, motivated, professional military capable of taking on one of the world’s “great powers.” And they will not stop until the win. It is precisely because of this that we must offer them our support until the end.

A thought on the Russian government and its military/military industrial complex/security apparatus- in a sense they are one of our best assets in our support of Ukraine. Corruption, partisanship, nepotism, fraud, theft, cronyism, and anachronistic and bloated Soviet/Russian bureaucracy in general, not to mention fear of change in the Russian military and government structure, keep Russia slow and stumbling forward.

Russian combat losses- the number of invaders killed increased by 1,140 as of Friday, and another 900 on Saturday for a total of 6,500 invaders killed for the previous week alone. “The uptick in Russian casualties is likely due to a range of factors including lack of trained personnel, coordination, and resources across the front,” says a report from Ukrinform, quoting a British Defense Ministry intelligence update.

As of today, Monday, 13 February, Russian combat losses are as follows:

Russian combat losses as of 13 February, 2023

Ukraine Updates and Recommended Reading

Update for today- mostly links to background and current reports, all of which I consider pertinent for developing a solid view of the war in Ukraine, of Russia’s capabilities, tactics, and probable courses of action, and an understanding of Russia’s overall threat against freedom and democracy worldwide.

There is hope in Belarus, where they are still not following Putin’s doctrine to the letter, and may well act to thwart his plans- from 29 January, 2023, from the RFERL website, “Amid Worries Over Russian Forces In Belarus, Former Security Officer Says Belarusian Conscripts Won’t Fight.”

From the RAND website, from March, 2017, see the testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” And What Can Be Done About It  by Christopher S. Chivvis. This testimony, though it is from 2017 and as such its predictions and warnings have become history, is worth the time to read.

The testimony notes Russia’s goals in their hybrid war as creating division in and weakening NATO, subversion of pro-western and democratic governments, the creation of pretexts for war, and to justify the annexation of territory as a few of those goals. It covers briefly the development of Russia’s hybrid, non-military toolbox, growing out of the “traditional” espionage and subversion used by the USSR. It stresses the importance of countering Russia’s threats in the information realm- specifically in the media and news, on social media, and the internet in general, along with strengthening of governments’ cyber security and enhancing collection and sharing of intelligence among European, EU, and allied nations as key in the fight against the Russian threat.

Continuing in that realm, from the Army University Press website, September-October 2020, see “Russian New Generation Warfare Deterring and Winning the Tactical  Fight” by James Derleth, PhD.

For a quick, two-page introduction to Russian Military Doctrine from August, 2020, see “Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy” from the Congressional Research Service website. Key points of note include hybrid and new generation warfare, non-kinetic strategies such as the use of the information sphere (control of media, social media, information creation and delivery, etc.), Russia’s historical and continued emphasis on offensive doctrine and targeting of infrastructure, and lack of concern for mass casualties due to lack of training, morale, and poor command and control.

This RAND page, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND” has pages of resources- background, testimony, and commentary. It covers strategies and positions of all the players, and has sections dedicated to capabilities, humanitarian concerns, diplomatic and political aspects of the war, and more.

More background, from the United Sates Army War College Press, June 2011, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications”  assesses Russia’s performance in Georgia and how it forced doctrinal changes in the Russian military.

Updates directly from Ukraine are available at the Ukrinform website.

For an update on the current situation on the ground in Ukraine, see the latest assessment from the Institute for the Study of War.

Finally, as always an update of Russian combat losses to date, totaling 131,290- an increase of 700 from the previous day. I read that a New York Times report puts the total number of dead and wounded Russian soldiers at about 200,000 so far. The number will only increase, with daily numbers increasing, until Russia comes to its senses, abandons the Tsar’s mania for conquest, and leaves all Ukrainian territory.

Russian combat losses as of 05 February, 2023

Commentary- Russia/USSR- Business as Usual, Georgia War Background, United24- Aid to Ukraine

I have recently been researching Russian military doctrine. The latest official release of their doctrine that I could find was from 2014, though there appears to have been a more recent revision apparently without significant changes. One document that clearly outlines and analyses the 2014 doctrine is a NATO Research Paper (from 2015)- “Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and beyond: threat perceptions, capabilities and ambitions.” Clicking the link takes you to a downloadable PDF.

The paper opens with a quote by George Kennan writing as “X” in Foreign Affairs Magazine in July, 1947, which fairly summed up the doctrine then and does so even more accurately today (just substitute “Russian” for “Soviet” if you feel the need):

Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend-at all costs this concept of Russia’s position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.

There you have it. In my estimation, the “new Russia” project, which grew out of the collapse of the Soviet Union as of 08 December, 1991, began as a recovery and stabilisation project. As it progressed it became less passive and cooperative, even obsequious, and developed the current doctrine of intervention, power projection, and offensive enlargement. Again, back to the same old tricks, that is, the promotion of total state power through control of the media, security apparatus, a growing army and military industrial complex, withdrawal from treaties and cooperative security organisations, increased missile testing and development, increased numbers and capability of nuclear arms, disregard for the UN and the rules it has agreed to abide by as a member, and broken continually, and so on ad infinitum.

All of this leads to the present day- blatant invasion of a sovereign country with concomitant genocide and war crimes and plans to continue the same across Europe and Asia until Russia’s “great power” has been restored. Regarding war crimes, those in Ukraine are certainly not the first Russia has engaged in- read about recent warrants issued for war crimes in the Georgia war of 2008.

For background on the Georgia war, and an assessment of both Georgian and Russian performance in the war, see the United States Army War College Press Monograph 576, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications.”  Although the war was conducted in 2008, and the monograph published in 2011, it provides detailed and useful background data on Russia’s largest military operation up to 2008, discusses Russian shortcomings, and is a good starting point for understanding changes in Russian forces and doctrine since then. The monograph together with the NATO Research Paper noted above highlight the changes that Russia sought to make and how their failure to implement many of those changes are clearly visible in their performance in Ukraine.

So where does that summary leave us? First, we are on the right track- the west, US, Europe, and the world at large with support for Ukraine. We must continue to support them, and continue to increase our support whether it be food and clothing, medical supplies, ammunition, or the most high-tech weapons systems at our disposal. Russian resources are growing thin. Russian support of Putin’s war of conquest will soon reach a tipping point, and perhaps we’ll see the entire structure come tumbling down. And when that happens we must take full advantage of the situation, and not squander it, and the security of Europe and the world, as we did in the 1990’s!

For today, there are so many ways that each of us can help Ukraine. See the list of links to sites where you can donate in the upper right. United24 is the main Ukrainian government clearinghouse for donations. The Ukrainian Army of Drones is one of the most effective ways you and I can help Ukraine defend itself. Right now Mark Hamill, of Star Wars fame, has become an ambassador of UNITED24 and its Drone Army.  Follow the link to learn more, and to to make a “dronation” to help Ukraine protect its skies.

As of today, 30 January 2023:

Russian combat losses as of 30 January, 2023

 

Ukraine Updates- Putin’s Demise, Orban’s Big Mouth, Czech Republic Elections, and Russian Dead

According to an interview with Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) on 24 Channel, not only is the dictator Putin’s time limited, but the the ability of Russia to continue to wage its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is waning. There is plenty of evidence for the latter part of the statement, I just hope the first part is as true. Here are some of the main quotes form the interview as posted on the Telegram channel The Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the NSDC):

🔹 «Some events that have been in the aggressor country indicate that the russian dictator is already doomed to defeat»
🔹 «People who are in putin’s closest circle are increasingly aware that russia has no prospects of winning the war against Ukraine»
🔹 «The issue of putin in russia is almost closed. Some people have already known the name of the person who will work there after putin»
🔹 «Representatives of the Ukrainian authorities have their own assumptions about what will happen next in russia and who can become the dictator’s successor»
🔹 «Ukrainians proved on the battlefield that they are capable of defending their independence and freedom»
🔹 «Ukraine’s partner countries will not allow russia to use nuclear weapons. And the nuclear blackmail started in the kremlin won’t have any consequences»

Here is the interview posted on YouTube (in Ukrainian without subtitles.)

Hungary’s Viktor Orban is at it again, acting as a puppet should, following Putin’s lead and stirring up trouble in the EU with disparaging remarks about Ukraine and threats of vetoes when it comes to sanctioning Russian energy. Not surprising at all. If only Orban could be replaced by a better candidate, as it seems the Czech Republic has chosen to do.  In elections there, former general Petr Pavel has beaten the billionaire Andrej Babis in the presidential election.

Comments on Russian “news and information”- remember that all “information” coming from Russia, out of Russia, via Russian sources is suspect,  tendentious, questionable to say the least, and in large part just lies. Manipulation of news and information is part of hybrid warfare and Russia is deep into it, though most of it seems targeted for a Russian audience, as anyone outside of the country with access to other sources will see right through the web of disinformation, propaganda, and in some cases downright humorous attempts at manipulation of facts that Russia passes off internally as news.

From the ISW website, see today’s RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT. From that assessment, comments on front-line Russian milbloggers and information control:

The Russian military command may also be attempting to resurrect its previously unsuccessful censorship efforts targeting the critical milblogger community.ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD conducted several unsuccessful attempts to promote self-censorship among milbloggers from different nationalist factions—including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers—in summer and fall 2022.[26] Russian military command also previously attempted to promote self-censorship among milbloggers by pushing the narrative that Russian milbloggers have been violating Russian operational security by uploading combat footage or revealing Russian positions online.[27] It is unclear if Russian President Vladimir Putin is supporting these restrictions given that he had been appeasing pro-war milbloggers by meeting with them, allowing them to autonomously operate on the frontlines, and tolerating their criticisms.[28] The Kremlin is also continuing to integrate some select milbloggers by offering to let them host TV shows on Russian state broadcasters.[29] The Russian MoD may be conducting its own line of effort to silence the milbloggers independent of Putin. ISW will continue to monitor to see if Putin overrules the Russian MoD’s efforts to silence milbloggers.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict milbloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of a possible new offensive. Alexander Kots—a member of the Russian Human Rights Commission under Russian President Vladimir Putin and a prominent milblogger—stated that there are rumors that Russian authorities will require war correspondents to wear bright blue press vests to identify themselves as journalists in the combat zone.[20] Kots and other milbloggers criticized the rumored decision, claiming that high-visibility vests will only help Ukrainian forces deliberately target war correspondents embedded in Russian units.[21] Some milbloggers even admitted that they have been hiding their “PRESS” labels for years and noted that this allowed hundreds of war correspondents to independently work on the frontlines without anyone’s formal orders.[22] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov also argued that generals who are introducing these regulations should be responsible for each war correspondent’s death after making them an easily visible target on the ground.[23] One milblogger accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately introducing new bureaucratic requirements that will limit the milbloggers’ ability to operate on the frontlines.[24]

Finally, an update on Russian combat losses from the Ukrinform website clearly shows increasing daily numbers of Russian casualties. Since hitting the 100,000 mark about a month back, the number of dead Russian soldiers has increased by 25,000. That is 25,000 Russian “soldiers”… some soldiers, Wagner mercenaries/criminals, and conscripted students, workers, peasants, and aged fathers and grandfathers killed in about one month. But they are replaceable- according to today’s ISW assessment, Putin is issuing pardons for criminals willing to fight in Ukraine, and has also stated that conscription age will not change in the spring conscription cycle (at least not until reporting day gets closer.)

Russian combat losses as of 28 January, 2023

Reflections on Soviet Imperialism and Collapse, and Seizure of Russian Assets

I wake every morning these days wondering what atrocity Russia has perpetuated as I slept. They seem to come one after the other, so many involving the destruction of cities and the killing of civilians. So much for the rules of war. But it is the (former) Soviet Union we are talking about here, now Russia. Jumping back 30 years or so, the primary concern of the architects of the “new Russia” seemed to have been only how to maintain control over the republics, that is, the Soviet satellites.  So much of the debate centered on how to keep Ukraine in check, and how not to lose territory, resources, and Russian “property” that in fact never belonged to them. This specifically included the country of Ukraine itself, Donbas, Crimea, and Sevastapol, the Baltics, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and so on- essentially all the countries (and their resources) that Russia had invaded and occupied and that Russia claimed as their own. Russian imperialism, couched in the reforms of Gorbachev- Glasnost and Perestroika, failed.  Yeltsin’s Russian “democracy” failed. The only thing that succeeded was their barbaric, imperialistic march toward their centuries-old goal of geopolitical domination, manifested today in their dictator Putin and Russia’s invasion, once again, of the sovereign state of Ukraine.

Seizure, Forfeiture, U.S. and International Law

Lately I have been reading about the economic side of the war, reparations, and future reconstruction. Recently the Brookings Institution posted a report that provides background arguments on restitution, freezing of assets, asset forfeiture constitutional and international legality, and so on. “Proposals to Seize Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Session 22 of the Congressional Study Group” was posted on the Brookings website on Thursday, December 29, 2022. It summarises the meeting held on 02 June, 2022 focused on Russian assets now held by the west. There are links on the page to plenty of reading on the subject- more than my non-legal mind can handle, but very informative nonetheless. See specifically Evans Criddle’s Rebuilding Ukraine Will Be Costly. Here’s How to Make Putin Pay for background, and Philip Zelikow’s A Legal Approach to the Transfer of Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine and Laurence Tribe’s essay $100 Billion. Russia’s Treasure in the U.S. Should Be Turned Against Putin for pro-forfeiture arguments.

My summary: whether or not the forfeiture of Russian assets is legal still remains a point of debate amongst the experts. But to me seizure seems clearly legal- or at least it could be made legal by all that I read. Arguments for forfeiture- under U.S. and international law, are supported by various constitutional lawyers such as Philip Zelikow and Laurence Tribe. Paul Stephan in Seizing Russian Assets gives clear arguments against forfeiture legality, but at the same time indicates that precedents are lacking.  Based on arguments from both “sides” forfeiture can be construed as a grey area.

While precedent does not exist, international law may be used to justify the forfeiture of all Russian property now under seizure- numerous references are made to the UN Charter, which Russia selectively abides by. They clearly have violated the Charter. Whether or not the Charter allows for forfeiture, or only seizure, is again in question by the experts.

Another argument for- Russia’s cyberattacks on the U.S. could also point to an “act of aggression” against us, tipping the argument toward forfeiture.  This would fall under U.S. law- see specifically the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) and the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), Also see the Patriot Act of 2001 and how it may affect both Acts.

Finally, and this is something I found no references to in terms of the forfeiture argument, there is the question of crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed by Russia. When and how do these international crimes affect the legality of forfeiture of Russian assets? Perhaps it is time to set a new precedent while these crimes are being committed, rather than waiting till after the fact to sue for restitution. See Sophie Williams’ articles on DiplomaticCourier.com for some food for thought- UKRAINE’S OPTIONS FOR PROSECUTING RUSSIA, AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS NOT UKRAINE’S SOLUTION, and LESSONS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR UKRAINE.  

Russian Combat Losses as of 21 January, 2023

How many Russians will Putin send to die?

Russian combat losses as of 21 January, 2023

 

 

 

Ukraine Updates 08 January, 2023- Recommended Reading

The war in Ukraine continues, with unflagging bravery and fortitude on the part of the defenders, and the support of the free world.  This is the way it should remain, until the end- that being Russia’s surrender, return of all Ukrainian territory, and withdrawal.  We- the US, Europe, NATO, our allies, should not waver in our support. We should increase our physical support, and increase our “non-kinetic” pressures against the Russian mafia state (sanctions, denial of services, aid to states threatened by Russia). Now, with my personal opinions out of the way, on to some of the sources of data that help shape those opinions.

A recent RAND paper, from 20 December, 2022, Responding to a Limited Russian Attack on NATO During the Ukraine War discusses possible scenarios that a limited attack against NATO or European targets by Russia might entail, what might provoke such an attack, and the range of response and retaliation options that we have. The RAND paper notes the need for the US, NATO, and Europe to have this response matrix ready now in the event that Russia initiates such an attack, and notes that increasing desperation on their part might increase the possibility an attack occurring.

From the Diplomatic Courier from 14 December, 2022- RUSSIA RISKS LOSING ARMENIA AS AN ALLY– Russia further isolates itself from its neighbor and CTSO ally through inaction regarding the Azerbaijan- Armenia conflict. Armenia seeks help from France on resolving the conflict, and close ties to Europe and the US in its choice to promote freedom and democracy in the country.

From Ukrinform, from 07 January, 2023- “Belarus is being occupied by military forces that are stationed at training grounds, most likely for a long time. And there will be no future for Belarus as an independent country,” say Oleksandr Pavliuk, Commander of Kyiv Defense Forces. The story is here- Belarus has no future as independent country- Kyiv Defense Commander

If you have the time or inclination, some light reading- Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and the Annexation of Crimea; The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare by Kent DeBenedictis, is available at Bloomsbury.com.

Another work that will prove informative is Putin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution; Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution, By Robert Horvath. It was published in 2014 and is available at Routledge.com.  I have both books on order, and would like to point out that I am in no way affiliated with or do I receive any remuneration from any of the publishers or sources I cite.

From ISW, update on the war for 07 January, 2023.

Finally, Russian combat losses continue to mount:

Russian combat losses as of 08 January, 2023

A New Year; Russian Dissent, More Casualties, Opinions, and Possibilities

The beginning of another year is upon us. And what a year we have left behind, at least as unsettling as the year before, which was one of the most divisive and frightening in my life so far. 2022- war, geopolitics on a scale unknown in many years, threats of nuclear confrontation, recession, and pandemic. What has become of mankind? A question I will not answer; instead on to some news.

The latest reports from Russia, digging into them at least, reveal some dissent. Growing dissent? Perhaps. There were Putin Christmas ornaments to hang on your tree, using the noose around his neck. People in Russia- not just in Ukraine, when asked what they want for Putin for the new year- answering “death.” More fires, more firebombs, more people speaking out, leaving the country.  Maybe. We only have access to so much information. A note to any young Russian males: according to Ukrainian reports, you only have about a week left to escape after which time borders will be closed and you will be sent to the war, very likely to die. Here is my favorite part of that article:

As Reznikov (the Ukrainian Defense Minister) pointed out, the only reason Russians will be sent to fight this war is “so that you protect criminals, their palaces, their bank accounts, and become criminals yourselves.”

Regarding Russian troops, various reports state the conscripts being sent to Ukraine are responsible for their own body armor, their own uniforms, aid kits, and field equipment. This is a good sign for Ukraine, very bad for Russia and its expendable citizens being sent into the meat grinder. Ukrainian Telegram channels often highlight the “equipment” the Russians soldiers have when captured or killed: helmets marked “child’s toy- does not provide any protection.” Aid kits from World War II! Tourniquets that are nothing more than old belts and rubber straps. Field gear… from a sporting goods store.  And finally body armor that would not stop anything above a small caliber round.

In Ukraine, morale is as high as ever. But that is nothing new. They have much to look forward to, with new weapons systems coming their way, including Patriot missiles, new round for existing missile systems, and more training and field equipment pouring in. They are fighting for their existence.

Here is the latest update on the war from the ISW- RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 5, 2023.

Finally, as always, Russian combat losses and deaths as of today, with daily numbers growing due to the effectiveness, fortitude, and intelligence of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Russian combat losses as of 05 January, 2023

Putin Visits Belarus, Zubok’s “Collapse”, Combat Losses

In the news today, from Ukrinform, Canada announces it will seize, and pursue the forfeiture of $26M belonging to the oligarch Abramovich. Canada is the first G7 country to pursue such a measure, and if approved, the assets will be given to Ukraine as part of their reconstruction compensation. Then they would only be short about about $999,974,000,000 according to recent estimates.

From the same site, there are numerous references to the meeting of Putin and Lukashenko in Belarus yesterday.  US and German monitors- and I am sure many other countries- are following the developments, but all indications from the Belarussian government are that the country “wants no part in Putin’s war”. With that said, Russia does have airfields in Belarus cleared for their use, has troops in the country, and has suggested working together against US and western sanctions.  There is also a report on the visit on Aljazeera.

I have just started reading Vladislav Zubok’s history of the Soviet collapse, aptly named “Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union.” The overall history is well know to everyone, or should be. The more unknown aspects such as the infighting, paranoia, ideological attacks, as well as the economic aspects and countless attempts at reform, creation of new governments, and in the end the chances that were had and lost because of fear, greed, and ignorance are disturbing. I can only summarise so much of the 500 pages, and suggest it be added to the reading list of anyone who wants to understand the historic and enduring disfunctionality of Russia/the USSR/the Russian Federation.  You can purchase Zubok’s Collapse at Yale University Press. Here is a book review from the London School of Economics.

There is one quote from the book that I must include. From the Russian philosopher Alexander Zinoviev, exiled from the USSR in the 1970’s, “You can create one thousand political parties in the Soviet Union, and all of them would degenerate into political mafias.” That fairly sums up Russia, no matter what it calls itself.

Russian combat losses as of today, from Ukrinform. The 100,000 deaths threshold is just a day or two away:

Russian combat losses as of 20 December, 2022